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1  | INTRODUC TION
In 2014, the Mental Health Foundation in the UK was commissioned 
to set up an inquiry into truth and lying in dementia care. This in-
volved a panel of experts, including people who were living with a 
diagnosis of dementia as well as family carers, who took evidence 
from a variety of other experts from numerous disciplines. Their re-
port was published in December 2016. In summary,
The panel felt that one should always start from a 
point as close to whole truth- telling as possible –  
always underpinned by respect and kindness towards 
the person with dementia – and if this is causing un-
necessary distress, move on to a response that might 
include an untruth.1
Some years before that, in their report Dementia: Ethical issues, a 
working party of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics had reached very 
 1Mental Health Foundation. (2016). What is truth? An inquiry about truth and lying in 
dementia care, p. 4. https://www.menta lheal th.org.uk/publi catio ns/what- truth - inqui 
ry- about - truth - and- lying - demen tia- care (last accessed December 15, 2020).
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Highly reputable bodies have said that lying is to be avoided when speaking with 
people living with dementia, unless it cannot be. And yet, the evidence is that many 
professionals looking after people who live with dementia have been lying to them. I 
wish to consider an underlying philosophical justification for the moral position that 
allows lying under some circumstances whilst still condemning it generally. It can 
seem difficult to ignore the immorality of lying, but thinkers have developed argu-
ments to get around the absolute prohibition. I shall argue that in concrete circum-
stances the object and the intended end of an action are not as clearly distinct as has 
been presumed. Further, looking at how language functions allows us to appeal to 
speech acts and to see the illocutionary force of a statement as way to broaden its 
purview. We need not think that the only options are between lying and not lying; 
there is also the possibility, in exigent circumstances, of ‘conforming to the reality’, 
which would allow a more nuanced account of moral acts, where the intentional na-
ture of the act is no longer to lie. There are, thus, extreme concrete circumstances 
where not to speak the truth may be excusable, even if regrettable.
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similar conclusions.2 Both reports, therefore, suggested that if at all 
possible you should tell the truth; but you should minimize distress by 
lying or by some other deception if (and only if) necessary to avoid 
distress.
In this paper, I wish to sketch an underlying justification for this 
moral stance. My argument will run as follows:
1.1. Lying to people with dementia is wrong and is mostly 
unnecessary.
1.2. However, there are circumstances where lying is excused 
and tolerated. (For the sake of clarity, I should say here that there 
is obviously a variety of ways in which it is possible to be untruth-
ful, e.g. by not saying something, but my focus is specifically on 
lying rather than other forms of deception.)
2. A variety of ways around the absolute prohibition of lying 
have been sought. Yet, inasmuch as the prohibition depends 
upon the act of lying having an overriding immoral object, 
namely to deceive or be untruthful, it can seem difficult to 
ignore.
3.1. However, first, in concrete circumstances the object and the 
intended end of an action are not as clearly distinct as is pre-
sumed, as shown by (a) a particular reading of Aquinas and (b) 
considering the intentional nature of actions.
3.2. Secondly, looking at how language functions allows us to ap-
peal to speech acts and to see the illocutionary force of a state-
ment as a means to broaden its purview.
4. In addition, we need not think that the only options are lying 
or not lying; there is also the possibility of ‘conforming to the 
reality’, as long as this is only pursued in exigent circumstances.
4.1. ‘Conforming to the reality’ allows a more nuanced account 
of moral acts, where the intentional nature of the act is no longer 
deception.
4.2. And the speech act, when ‘conforming to the reality’, has a 
different illocutionary force given the different circumstances.
5. Hence, there are concrete circumstances where not to speak 
the truth may be excusable, even if ceteris paribus it should only 
be used as an extreme option.
1.1 | Lying is wrong but is excused
The prohibition of lying has deep cultural roots. According to 
Aristotle, ‘falsehood is in itself mean and culpable, and the truth 
noble and worthy of praise’.3 Whether it be a matter of religious 
teaching, or of giving testimony under oath in a court of law or to a 
government committee, or of statements to a legislature (think of 
the consequences of a UK minister of the Crown misleading 
Parliament), or of claimed academic work (where plagiarism or 
falsified research can spell ruin to a career), dishonesty— specifically, 
telling lies— is condemned and can be harshly sanctioned. Lying is 
regarded as anything from a criminal act to a gross subversion of 
personal or institutional integrity.
On the one hand, therefore, in a variety of situations there 
seems to be an accepted absolute prohibition of lying, even if this 
seems to be whittled away by the behaviour of some politicians 
and others. On the other hand, it seems to be accepted that we 
all lie from time to time and that small or ‘white’ lies can be toler-
ated and might be for the best. The inevitability and permissibility 
of lying to people living with dementia seem to be accepted and 
tolerated.
In any case, the empirical evidence is that lies are told quite com-
monly to people living with dementia. James and colleagues carried 
out a survey of nurses and care staff in UK settings looking after 
people living with dementia and found that 96% had resorted to 
lies.4 In a survey of 76 psychiatrists in north- east England, albeit with 
only a 38% response rate, 69% had resorted to lying in looking after 
someone who lacked capacity if it were thought to be in the person’s 
best interests and 66% had sanctioned the use of lies.5 In a study in 
Italy, roughly 90% of nurses involved in dementia care found it ac-
ceptable to use lies, especially ‘to prevent or reduce aggressive be-
haviors’.6 Further, the use of (so- called) therapeutic lies seems 
legitimized by a study that shows that some people living with de-
mentia themselves would agree to lies if in the person’s best 
interests.7
Such is the support for lying to people with dementia under cer-
tain circumstances that, having accepted such lies are sometimes 
necessary, the literature has moved on to consider how lies might 
practically be put into effect, especially where behaviour is thought 
to be challenging.8 At the same time, the language has moved from 
talk of ‘lying’ to talk of ‘untruths’, which in part signals that some 
deceit is not stated (whereas, according to Bok’s seminal work, a lie 
is ‘any intentionally deceptive message which is stated’9), but which 
might also be seen as a way to side- step the inclination to regard 
lying as wrong; indeed, in related literature the talk is of ‘therapeutic 
untruths’ and ‘non- therapeutic lying’.10 Thus, perhaps, we can tell 
untruths therapeutically but not lies and the moral problem of pro-
fessionals lying dissipates!
 2Nuffield Council on Bioethics. (2009). Dementia: Ethical issues. Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics, p. 105, paragraph 6.26. https://www.nuffi eldbi oethi cs.org/publi catio ns/
dementia (last accessed December 15, 2020).
 3Aristotle. (1980). The nicomachean ethics (translated by D. Ross, revised by J. L. Ackrill & 
J. O. Urmson). Oxford University Press, p. 101.
 4James, I. A., Wood- Mitchell, A., Waterworth, A. M., Mackenzie, L., & Cunningham, J. 
(2006). Lying to people with dementia: Developing ethical guidelines for care settings. 
International Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 21(8), 800– 801.
 5Culley, H., Barber, R., Hope, A., & James, I. (2013). Therapeutic lying in dementia care. 
Nursing Standard, 28(1), 35– 39.
 6Cantone, D., Attena, F., Cerrone, S., Fabozzi, A., Rossiello, R., Spagnoli, L., & Pelullo, C. P. 
(2019). Lying to patients with dementia: Attitudes versus behaviours in nurses. Nursing 
Ethics, 26(4), 984– 992.
 7Day, A. M., James, I. A., Meyer, T. D., & Lee, D. R. (2011). Do people with dementia find 
lies and deception in dementia care acceptable? Aging and Mental Health, 15(7), 822– 829.
 8James, I. A., & Jackman, L. (2017). Understanding behaviour in dementia that challenges: A 
guide to assessment and treatment. Jessica Kingsley (see Chapter 16. Therapeutic lying, 
pp. 260– 279).
 9Bok, S. (1999). Lying: Moral choice in public and private life. Vintage Books, p. 13.
 10McKenzie, K., Taylor, S., Murray, G., & James, I. (2020). The use of therapeutic untruths 
by learning disability nursing students. Nursing Ethics, 27(8), 1607– 1617.
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My concern is that lying to people living with dementia has 
become too easy and too easy to justify. The reality should be the 
other way around: that mostly carers (of whatever kind) tell the 
truth and only exceptionally deceive or lie. To be clear, my aim is to 
gesture at a justification for not telling the truth under particular 
extreme circumstances, where under these circumstances we do 
not have to think in terms of lying as such. Though informed by 
clinical practice, this is a philosophical discussion. How the conclu-
sions of the discussion are put into effect is another matter. But 
the tendency to resort to lies too readily is to be regretted, not 
encouraged.
1.1.1 | The ubiquitous case
There is a paradigm case that is used to justify lying. It is that of 
the woman living with a diagnosis of dementia who has a terribly 
distressed reaction when told of her husband’s death. She subse-
quently forgets that he has died. When told again that he has died 
she undergoes the same very distressed reaction. Her repeated 
marked distress leads to the very reasonable thought that perhaps 
it would be kinder not to upset her and to tell her a lie, e.g. that he 
will be in later, in the knowledge that she will forget this but will 
not then be distressed, which is seen as a better and more ethical 
outcome.
I have to say that, in the course of 25 years of practice in the field 
of dementia, I do not recall such a case exactly. Of course, I do recall 
distressing cases where a person living with dementia had to be told 
repeatedly that someone they loved had died. Naturally enough, car-
ers would dissemble, avoid and even lie. But what I do not remember 
is a case where such tactics had to be pursued as a policy over a long 
period of time. I do remember three difficult cases very well (I have 
changed some details below for the sake of confidentiality), which 
could be taken as offering different paradigms.
1.1.2 | Case 1: the benefit of truth- telling
A man living with a moderate to severe dementia was persuaded by 
his family to go into a care home because his wife (his main carer) 
was ill. She was admitted to hospital and after about a week she 
died. The family were adamant that the husband should not be told 
this news on the grounds that he would forget to ask about his wife. 
However, he became increasingly agitated and then positively vio-
lent enough to warrant the use of psychotropic medication. The next 
move would have been to detain him under compulsory powers in a 
psychiatric unit for assessment. In his best interests, his sons per-
sisted in saying that staff were not to tell their father of their moth-
er’s death. However, a member of staff went ahead and explained 
to the resident that sadly his wife had died. He was very upset, but 
his agitation dissipated. His sons were initially furious, but they were 
amazed to see his improvement and graciously accepted that telling 
the truth was the right course of action. They were able to arrange 
a small memorial ceremony, which their father attended. He came 
off psychotropic medication. This would be a paradigm case of the 
benefit and justice of telling the truth.
1.1.3 | Case 2: different ways of grieving
A lady living with advanced dementia was admitted to a home. Her 
very attentive husband visited every day. But he suddenly fell ill and 
died. Their son was most concerned about whether and how to tell 
his mother of the death. He was given support and decided to tell 
her. After he had done so she was fine and any subsequent allusions 
to her husband or to his death were simply ignored. She would hap-
pily look at photograph albums in which there were pictures of him, 
but made no comment and showed no adverse reactions.
This is a different paradigm, partly showing that telling the truth 
can be harder for those who have to do so than for the person hear-
ing the information. We do not know whether the lady simply did 
not recall the news that her husband had died and had forgotten 
him; or whether her reaction was a form of denial as part of a de-
fence mechanism. Either way, the paradigm teaches us that there is 
no need to batter someone’s defences. We grieve, even in dementia, 
in different ways.
1.1.4 | Case 3: extended grief
In this case, which was very close to the ubiquitous paradigm, a lady 
living with dementia in a care home had suffered the loss of both her 
husband and her son in quick succession. Her daughter continued to 
visit. The mother had a dense amnesia affecting recall. Whenever 
she was told of the deaths of her husband and son, she would be-
come very upset as if being told for the first time. It was very difficult 
for all concerned, but the agreed approach was to be straightforward 
with her. It could be extremely uncomfortable and upsetting to tell 
her the truth. But she was grateful and it became easier over time.
Having seen her for several years, during which her cognitive im-
pairment generally was worsening, the last time I saw her was with a 
social worker. When the lady mentioned her husband she seemed to 
sense something was wrong and said, ‘Oh no, wait, something hap-
pened to him’. She then spontaneously recalled his death and the 
death of her son. She was sad, but not overwhelmed.
She is a paradigm of someone who was able to grieve success-
fully, albeit in an extended manner, despite her worsening cognitive 
function. It would have been easier to lie to her, but this seems like a 
paradigm case where to do so would have undermined her standing 
as a person of dignity, worthy of respect.
1.1.5 | Summary
These three paradigms, unlike the ubiquitous paradigm, suggest that 
honesty is the best policy: lying to people with dementia is mostly 
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wrong and unnecessary. Yet, there are circumstances where lies can 
be excused and tolerated. For example, I recall an instance where, 
but for the use of a lie, a man would certainly have had to be given 
an intramuscular injection of a psychotropic drug. The lie seemed 
preferable.
1.2 | The absolute prohibition
The aim of this section is to present some definitions of lying (very 
briefly) and then to give examples of those who have favoured an 
absolute prohibition of lying, with some of their reasoning. Although 
I move on to look at suggested exceptions to the prohibition, in the 
first place it seems important to see the strength of the reasoning in 
support of an absolute prohibition.
A sustained account and defence of the absolute prohibition of 
lying from a Christian perspective is provided by Christopher 
Tollefsen, according to whom, ‘…the absolute view holds… that false 
assertion is always wrong, and thus should always be ruled out as a 
possible object of choice’.11 Later he says: ‘Lying always involves in-
tentional damage to the goods of personal integrity and community, 
and it is always incompatible with a virtuous orientation toward the 
goods of truth and religion’.12
Tollefsen puts forward a raft of cogent arguments in favour of 
absolutism. One such argument draws heavily on Christian, and in 
particular Catholic, tradition, ‘… that there are acts which ought 
never to be chosen…’ and that ‘… judging acts only from the stand-
point of their intention, or the good sought overall, is radically 
misguided’.13
The cogency of many of his arguments encourages me to think 
that departing from the truth should be exceptional. One of the ar-
guments in favour of allowing veracity to slip, however, concerns this 
view that the object of a human act can determine it to be evil and, 
therefore, absolutely to be avoided. To this I shall return.
Having already in passing given Bok’s definition of lying (‘any in-
tentionally deceptive message which is stated’14), we can find very 
similar definitions elsewhere; for example, Bernard Williams takes ‘a 
lie to be an assertion, the content of which the speaker believes to be 
false, which is made with the intention to deceive the hearer with 
respect to that content’.15
Accordingly, a lie involves a statement made with the intention to 
deceive someone. In large measure, it is the definition of a lie that 
shows why it is so universally considered to be morally wrong or bad, 
even if it allows exceptions: ‘the wrongfulness of lying is… built into 
the definition of the term’.16 That is, lying can be seen as a thick con-
cept. If I say that I’ve told a lie, generally speaking it will be under-
stood that I’ve done something reprehensible.
In discussing lying in the context of people living with dementia, 
it seems right to hang onto this fundamental point. As Bok states:
…I believe that we must at the very least accept as an 
initial premise Aristotle’s view that lying is ‘mean and 
culpable’ and that truthful statements are preferable 
to lies in the absence of special considerations. This 
premise gives an initial negative weight to lies. It holds 
that they are not neutral from the point of view of our 
choices; that lying requires explanation, whereas 
truth ordinarily does not.17
An early and often cited argument against lying comes from On the 
law of war and peace by Hugo Grotius (1583– 1645), who stated that a 
lie involves:
… a conflict with the existing and continuing right of 
him to whom the speech or sign is addressed… [and] 
that right is nothing else than the liberty of judgement 
which, as if by some tacit agreement, men who speak 
are understood to owe to those with whom they 
converse.18
A very similar argument, in effect that social discourse and society 
itself depend on people being able to trust what others say to them, 
can be found in Immanuel Kant (1724– 1804), who saw truthfulness as 
an ‘unconditional duty’.19 In what can be regarded, as far as absolutism 
and lying are concerned, as a locus classicus Kant writes:
… truthfulness is a duty that must be regarded as the 
basis of all duties founded on contract, and the laws of 
such duties would be rendered uncertain and useless 
if even the slightest exception to them were admitted.
To be truthful (honest) in all declarations is, therefore, 
a sacred and unconditionally commanding law of rea-
son that admits of no expediency whatsoever.20
To lie is to offend against the foundations of what is right: ‘For a lie 
always harms another; if not some other human being, then it never-
theless does harm to humanity in general, inasmuch as it vitiates the 
very source of right’.21
 11Tollefsen, C. O. (2014). Lying and Christian ethics. Cambridge University Press, p. 79.
 12Ibid: 128.
 13Ibid: 101.
 14Bok, op. cit. note 9.
 15Williams, B. (2002). Truth and truthfulness: An essay in genealogy. Princeton University 
Press, p. 96.
 16Kemp, K. W., & Sullivan, T. (1993). Speaking falsely and telling lies. Proceedings of the 
American Catholic Philosophical Association, 67, 151– 170.
 17Bok, op. cit. note 9, p. 30.
 18Grotius, H. (1925). On the law of war and peace (translated by F. W. Kelsey, first 
published 1625). Bobbs- Merrill, pp. 613– 614.
 19Kant, I. (1993). On a supposed right to lie because of philanthropic concerns. In 
Grounding for the metaphysics of morals with on a supposed right to lie because of 
philanthropic concerns (3rd ed., pp. 63– 67), (translated by J. W. Ellington). Hackett 
Publishing Company, p. 66.
 20Ibid: 65.
 21Ibid: 64– 65.
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Some centuries before, Thomas Aquinas (1225– 1274) had made 
a similar point about truthfulness:
Since man is by nature a social being, there is a natural 
indebtedness of one person to another in regard to 
those things without which life in society could not be 
maintained. People could not live with one another 
were there not a mutual trust that they were being 
truthful to one another.22
Later he was to state: ‘it is clear that lying is directly … contrary to 
the virtue of truth’.23
No more needs to be said to make the point that lying has been 
condemned for many centuries in Western culture, as it has else-
where. Instead, I wish to look briefly at some of the exceptions that 
have been proposed to the absolute prohibition of lying.
1.2.1 | Exceptions to the prohibition
As we have seen, according to Grotius, lying is always wrong. But he 
held it is not possible to lie to children or the insane (sic): ‘since in-
fants and insane persons do not have liberty of judgement’.24 Hence, 
it is not possible to infringe a person’s freedom to judge matters if 
they lack the ability to judge properly in the first place, as might be 
the case with people who have impaired decision- making capacity 
because of dementia. Furthermore, Grotius held that beneficent lies 
can be tolerated:
… whenever it is certain that he to whom the conversa-
tion is addressed will not be annoyed at the infringe-
ment of his liberty in judging, or rather will be grateful 
therefore, because of some advantage which will fol-
low, in this case also a falsehood in the strict sense, 
that is a harmful falsehood, is not perpetrated.25
On this basis, he was inclined to allow lies for medical reasons, say-
ing that a person does not lie when she ‘comforts a sick friend by per-
suading him of what is not true’.26
Similar thoughts have been expressed in modern times. In hold-
ing that lying always involves free communication between people 
who are fully responsible and rational, Donagan felt it would not be 
possible to lie to ‘children, madmen, or those whose minds have been 
impaired by age or illness’, since they are not fully responsible and 
rational.27
Tollefsen gives an account of the thought of John Cassian 
(roughly 360– 435 AD), who is cited as an authority for the belief that 
‘a physician may, and sometimes must, lie to his patients’.28 Tollefsen 
summarizes three ideas to be found in Cassian: ‘… that lying can only 
be permitted for good, and not evil; that it can only be permitted of 
necessity; and that it must be regarded as “medicinal”’.29
Tollefsen moves on to consider the work of Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
(1906– 1945). Like Cassian, Bonhoeffer also talks about emergencies 
and necessity. Interestingly, he was acutely aware of the inevitability 
of guilt in situations where someone might feel impelled to lie. He 
recognized that lying is disordered, but cautioned against dealing in 
the abstract with problems to do with lying in a good cause. The 
abstract approach,
…fails to bring about the authentic decision in which 
the whole man [sic], complete with his knowledge and 
his will, seeks and finds the good in the equivocal 
complexity of a historical situation solely through the 
venture of the deed.30
What emerges from these thinkers, again over a considerable time-
frame, is that lies might be tolerated in emergencies, for therapeutic 
reasons, to help people who would find it difficult to make decisions 
for themselves. Moreover, Bonhoeffer alerts us to the ‘equivocal com-
plexity of a historical situation’. Let me park these ideas for a moment.
1.3 | Objects and embedded intentions
I shall now argue that in concrete circumstances the object and the 
intended end of an action are not as clearly distinct as was presumed 
in Tollefsen’s arguments about traditional Catholic teaching.31 I shall 
show this by (a) a particular reading of Aquinas and (b) considering 
the intentional nature of an action.
We find in Aquinas the understanding of human moral actions 
split into three determinants: objects, intentions and circumstances 
(which includes consequences).32 Now, according to this under-
standing, the goodness of moral acts is mainly determined by the 
object of the act.33 (Whilst the objectum of an act is normally re-
ferred to as its ‘object’, the Dominican theologian Thomas Gilby 
(1902– 1975) refers instead to the ‘objective’ of an activity— as will be 
seen in the quotes from his translation and from his comments 
below.) The object or objective is, according to Gilby, ‘… what is 
 22Aquinas, T. (2006). Summa theologiae. Volume 41 (2a2ae. 101- 122): Virtues of justice in 
the human community (translated by T. C. O’Brien). Cambridge University Press, p. 141 
(2a2ae. 109, 3, ad1).
 23Ibid: 151 (2a2ae, 110, 2).
 24Grotius, op. cit. note 18, p. 614.
 25Ibid: 616.
 26Ibid.
 27Donagan, A. (1977). A theory of morality. Chicago University Press, p. 89.
 28Tollefsen, op. cit. note 11, p. 60.
 29Ibid: 61.
 30Bonhoeffer, D. (1995). Ethics (translated by N. H. Smith). Touchstone, p. 212. Cited in 
Tollefsen, op. cit. note 11, p. 65.
 31Tollefsen, op.cit. note 11, pp.82– 101.
 32Aquinas, T. (2006). Summa theologiae. Volume 18 (1a2ae. 18- 21): Principles of morality 
(edited by T. Gilby). Cambridge University Press, p. 19 (1a2ae, 18, 4). In fact, a fourth 
element is also mentioned, namely the way in which moral acts are grounded in nature, 
but this feature of moral acts does not directly determine their goodness or badness.
 33Ibid: 53 (1a2ae, 19, 2).
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aimed at, consciously or unconsciously, from the beginning; it is the 
“why” of activity and causally shapes its meaning’.34 However, in his 
appendix to the relevant passages, Gilby suggests that this abstract 
generalization about moral acts, where the object tells us what kind 
of act something is, is not enough when it comes to passing judge-
ment on a particular act. We learn of the act’s specific character from 
its object, but ‘A more rounded judgment calls for appreciation of its 
circumstances, and some assessment of the intentions behind it’.35 
Later, Gilby suggests that these determinants of the morality of acts 
are not ‘sealed off from one another in real life’: ‘… a single act is not 
to be pulled apart into three acts because it is scrutinized according 
to three mental categories. … when applied in the concrete they are 
over- lapping and their relations are criss- cross and complex.’36
The object of an act is what it aims at (which tells us what kind of act 
it is), but intentions aim at ends. Gilby recognizes that ends and objects 
may become entwined: ‘what starts as an end may finish up as an objec-
tive’.37 Thus we find Aquinas writing: ‘… the end intended has the force 
of an objective’.38 And, ‘… since the goodness of an act of will depends 
on its objective … it accordingly depends on the end intended’.39
Aquinas is clear that, ‘You cannot call an act of will good if its 
cause be an evil intention’.40 Still, Davies comments that Aquinas,
… denies that the goodness of an action can be deter-
mined by the goodness of its intention, even though he 
accepts that good intentions can be commended and 
that their goodness can, as it were, overflow into the 
action thereby preserving it in goodness insofar as it 
springs from a desire for what is objectively good.41
The relevance of these medieval distinctions should be clear. We 
may wish to say that lying is wrong objectively: its object is always de-
ception, to move away from truthfulness. But the intention might be 
good and the circumstances (including the consequences) might make 
the lie praiseworthy (e.g. therapeutic). An alternative would be to say 
the object is not actually a deception; instead, the act is aiming at bring-
ing about relief, at calming and so forth.
But just to highlight the complexity, deciding on my intention is not 
straightforward. I can fool myself. As the philosopher Elizabeth 
Anscombe (1919– 2001) wrote: ‘The idea that one can determine one’s 
intentions by making … a little speech to oneself is obvious bosh’.42 She 
was more inclined to say ‘what a man actually does’ is important in un-
derstanding someone’s intentions.43 Anscombe suggested that inten-
tional actions are those ‘to which a certain sense of the question 
“Why?” is given application’;44 and she continued (albeit she recognized 
this was an insufficient statement): ‘the sense is of course that in which 
the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting’.45 One can also speak 
of the intentional nature of an action— the intention embodied in the 
action— which will need to make reference to all its surrounding circum-
stances. Again, the relevance should be clear: my intention (to calm the 
person), as shown by my action (telling a lie), aims at an end, also the 
object of the act, which can be a human good, inspired by the virtues of 
compassion and prudence, namely to bring solace and comfort to a per-
son who otherwise would be in a miserable and desperate state.
1.4 | Speech acts
As we have seen, an aspect on which the definitions of lying tend to 
agree is that a lie is stated. A lie is an act of speech. It may be, there-
fore, that we can make some headway in discussing lies in the context 
of dementia by considering J. L. Austin’s work on speech acts. This will 
provide a broader understanding of how language functions.
According to Harrison, ‘Austin’s primary target was the verifica-
tionist presumption that the only meaningful sentences are those 
which express true or false statements’.46 What we say is not just a 
description of some thing, which can either be true or false, but is also 
performative. Performative utterances do something. In saying that I 
promise to post the letter, I am not describing something— a 
commitment— that is going on in my mind, I am making a promise. I am 
performing an act. Such a performative utterance is neither true nor 
false, whereas pointing to the inner commitment (which could, for in-
stance, not be there) might well be.
Inevitably, philosophers argue about these things. For present 
purposes it seems reasonable to say that speech is not just words 
that may or may not correspond to the reality of the world. For when 
I speak, I might be doing a variety of things.
So, speaking is acting. Moreover, it is acting in a particular situa-
tion. As Austin says:
Once we realise that what we have to study is not the 
sentence but the issuing of an utterance in a speech 
situation, there can hardly be any longer a possibility 
of not seeing that stating is performing an act.47
Austin also made the now classic distinctions between locutionary, 
illocutionary and perlocutionary acts.
The locutionary act is just the act of saying something, albeit this 
can be understood in a variety of ways, from its sounds (phonetics), to 
its grammar, to its meaning. The illocutionary act is the function of the 
 34Gilby, appendix 11 ‘Moral objectives’ in Aquinas, op. cit. note 32, p. 168.
 35Gilby, appendix 11 ‘Moral objectives’ in Aquinas, op. cit. note 32, p. 170.
 36Gilby, appendix 14 ‘Ends and objectives’ in Aquinas, op. cit. note 32, p. 176.
 37Ibid.
 38Aquinas, op. cit. note 32, p. 27 (1a2ae, 18, 6, ad 1).
 39Ibid: 71 (1a2ae, 19, 7).
 40Ibid: (1a2ae, 19, 7, ad 2).
 41Davies, B. (2014). Thomas Aquinas’s Summa theologiae: A guide and commentary. Oxford 
University Press, p. 167.




 46Harrison, B. (1979). An introduction to the philosophy of language. Macmillan Press, p. 
168.
 47Austin, J. L. (1962). How to do things with words. Clarendon Press, p. 138.
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statement, which gives it its illocutionary force. The statement might 
act as an answer, a promise, an intention, a decision, and so on. The 
locution might be the same, but the illocutionary force might be differ-
ent. ‘He’ll be here tomorrow’ might function as reassurance or as per-
functoriness, which highlights the importance of the manner of speech. 
The perlocutionary act is a matter of the practical consequences of the 
locution: the person is encouraged, pleased, annoyed and the like.
Again, much philosophical ink has been spilt over these distinc-
tions. But here I only wish to suggest the possibility that the illocu-
tionary force of certain locutions in particular circumstances would 
not amount to lying but to reassuring.
1.5 | Synthesis: conforming to the reality
I have been trying to sketch a position that supports the uncomfort-
able inclination to think both that lying is morally bad and that at 
times it seems inevitable. If we say that lying is bad, we seem to be 
saying that many formal and informal carers act immorally. If we say 
that lying is acceptable, even if only under certain circumstances, 
we seem to open a potential floodgate to deception. For, ‘…the 
harmlessness of lies is notoriously disputable. …the failure to look at 
an entire practice rather than at their own isolated case often blinds 
liars to cumulative harm and expanding deceptive activities’.48With 
direct reference to clinical practice, Bok writes: ‘The entire institu-
tion of medicine is threatened by practices lacking in candor, how-
ever harmless the results may appear in some individual cases’.49And 
she also talks of ‘…coarsened judgment and diminished credibil-
ity…’,50 which seem real threats from the use of lies in any 
institution.
My preference, therefore, is to find a way of speaking that avoids 
the pejorative connotations of lying but leaves its prohibition intact. 
The notion of ‘conforming to the reality’ seems helpful, which de-
rives from con suggesting ‘together’ and formare meaning ‘to form’. 
The carer forms a reality with the person living with dementia.
In the reality that exists at the moment in question, the objec-
tive of the statement (‘He’ll be here tomorrow’, when in fact he is 
dead) is to put the person at ease, to reassure and calm. A reality 
is formed in which the intentional nature of the act, its end, is the 
same as the object at which the act aims (which makes it a partic-
ular kind of act). Moreover, both end and aim are supported by, 
and examples of, the exercise of the virtues of charity and practical 
wisdom. We can also say that, whatever the locution, the illocu-
tionary force of the statement, its function is, with compassion, 
to decrease anxiety and irritability. In addition, the perlocutionary 
act is that an escalation of agitation is avoided and suffering al-
leviated. The circumstances of the act are such that the need for 
de- escalation is met and the situation calmed. (Of course, the carer 
might find words other than ‘He’ll be here tomorrow’ that would 
avoid such a blatant lie, such as ‘Not today, I’m afraid’. But a judge-
ment would have to be made about the effect of such words on the 
recipient of the statement.)
Does ‘conforming to the reality’ license lying on a grander scale, 
even if only incrementally? Well, of course, it might. But, first, this 
requires that what is stated is a lie and the point of the use of the 
notion of ‘conforming to the reality’ is that it should not be seen as 
such. Or, at least, it is not a lie sans phrase. The object of the act 
cannot now simply be regarded as deception or untruth. In the re-
ality formed between those involved, the aim and intention are not 
deception, but comfort. Moreover, secondly, we inhabit here the 
concrete circumstances envisaged by Gilby where there is criss- 
crossing and complexity in the objects and intended ends of the 
action.51 Here too (since we are presuming that other approaches— 
looking for alternative meanings in what the person is saying, dis-
traction, and ‘going along with’— have all been futile52), what is 
envisaged are the demands to be found in Bonhoeffer’s ‘equivocal 
complexity of a historical situation’,53 where the real situation is 
exigent.
So there is nothing to suggest that ‘conforming to the reality’ 
should be easy. Nothing here is intended to be facile, unthinking or 
as automatic as a ‘white lie’, rather it requires an effort of judge-
ment; in particular, the virtue of practical wisdom: that this is the 
way to achieve the intended good end at which the act aims. We 
must also remember that the long- established reasons to allow ‘con-
forming to the reality’— only in emergencies, for therapeutic reasons, 
to help people who are unable to make the requisite judgements 
themselves— should all still hold.
One final point, ‘conforming to the reality’ is not to be identified 
with ‘Specialised Early Care for Alzheimer's’ (SPECAL), as described in 
Contented dementia.54 SPECAL is an approach to dementia that con-
tains some good ideas, but the thought that the person with dementia 
should never be contradicted and that the past should be made the 
present at all times willy- nilly is not what I am suggesting here. Instead, 
in some very tricky extreme circumstances, and exceptionally, a deci-
sion might be made to go along with or encourage another reality.
2  | CONCLUSION
It seems, then, that there are concrete exigent circumstances where 
not to speak the truth to a person with dementia may be excusable, 
even if (other things being equal) telling a lie should be avoided at all 
costs. However, the lie must seem ineludible, not just convenient; it 
should stem from virtues such as charity, compassion and practical 
wisdom; yet it should engender a sense of unease or guilt in response 
to the virtuous inclination to honesty.
 48Bok, op. cit. note 9, p. 60.
 49Ibid: 68.
 50Ibid: 132.
 51Gilby, op. cit. note 36.
 52See Mental Health Foundation, op. cit. note 1, pp. 27– 35.
 53Bonhoeffer, op. cit. note 30.
 54James, O. (2009). Contented dementia. Vermillion.
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